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Abstract Humans routinely estimate the size and weight
of objects. Yet, when lifting two objects of equal weight
but different size, they often perceive the smaller object as
being heavier. This size–weight illusion (SWI) is known to
have a lesser effect on motor control of object lifting. How
the nervous system combines ‘‘weight’’ and ‘‘size’’ cues
with prior experience and whether these cues are differ-
entially integrated for perception and sensorimotor action
is still not fully understood. Therefore, we assessed not
only whether the experience of size biases weight percep-
tion, but also if experience of weight biases the size per-
ception of objects. Further, to investigate differences
between perceptual and motor systems for cue-experience
integration, participants haptically explored the weight of
an object with one hand and then shaped the aperture
of their other hand to indicate its perceived size.
Results—First, next to a SWI, healthy adults (N = 21)
perceived lighter objects as being smaller and heavier
objects as being larger, demonstrating a weight–size illu-
sion (WSI). Second, participants were more susceptible to
either the SWI or WSI. Third, aperture of the non-explor-
ing hand was scaled to perceived weight and not to phys-
ical size. Hand openings were consistently smaller than
physical size, with SWI-sensitive participants being sig-
nificantly more affected than WSI-sensitive subjects. We
conclude: first, both size and weight perceptions are biased
by prior experience. Weight perception is biased by
expectations of size, while size perception is influenced by
the expectancy of weight. Second, humans have the ten-
dency to use one cue predominantly for both types of
perception. Third, combining perceived weight with
expected size influenced hand motor control, while online
haptic feedback was largely ignored. Finally, we present a
processing model underlying the size–weight cue integra-
tion for the perceptual and motor system.
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Introduction
Object manipulation requires the appropriate scaling of
the hand aperture to the size of the object and the gen-
eration of lift and grip forces according to object weight.
To estimate object properties and to issue appropriate
motor commands in light of sensory and motor system
noise, the central nervous system (CNS) combines affer-
ent sensory cues with previous knowledge about object
features. Recently, Bayesian Decision Theory has been
applied to formalize processes of cue and sensorimotor
integration (Ko¨rding and Wolpert 2006; Van Beers et al.
2002). According to this view, the nervous system com-
bines prior knowledge about object properties gained
through former experience (‘‘the prior’’) with current
sensory cues (‘‘the likelihood’’), to generate appropriate
object property estimations (‘‘the posterior’’) for action or
perception.
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In most cases, the combination of prior and likelihood
leads to an appropriate perception and behavior, but per-
ception can be ‘‘misleading,’’ if the prior is weighted
higher than the likelihood, thus giving rise to a perception
that does not correspond to the actual physical properties of
the object. The size–weight illusion (SWI), first described
by Charpentier (1891), represents such a case. The SWI
arises when an individual lifts two objects of equal weight,
but of different size, and perceives the smaller object as
heavier. The illusion is robust (Chouinard et al. 2009;
Dijker 2008; Flanagan et al. 2008; Flanagan and Beltzner
2000; Grandy and Westwood 2006; Kawai 2002, 2003;
Murray et al. 1999), and the effect does not cease when the
lifter is made aware that both objects have the same weight
(Flanagan and Beltzner 2000). The SWI is believed to be a
primarily haptic phenomenon as vision does not substan-
tially contribute to the effect (Ellis and Lederman 1993).
There is evidence that perceptual and motor systems are
differentially affected by the SWI. When people were asked
to lift objects in an SWI context, they learned within the first
10 trials to scale their grip force according to the actual
weight of the object, even though they still perceived the
smaller object as heavier (Flanagan and Beltzner 2000).
A subsequent study showed that experience reduces the
prevalence of the SWI (Flanagan et al. 2008). Participants
had trained up to 11 days to lift blocks with weights that
varied inversely with volume. In addition to the rapid motor
adaptation, they learned to predict the correct weights
within about 240 lifts indicating that the perceptual system
does adapt to weight cues, albeit at a slower pace than the
motor system. Recent evidence suggests that these differ-
ences of the perceptual and motor system may be based on
different mechanisms for integrating prior and likelihood
(Brayanov and Smith 2010). The sensorimotor system is
believed to function in a Bayesian manner when integrating
probabilities subsequently used for motor commands.
In contrast, the perceptual system integrates the prior and
likelihood in an anti-Bayesian manner, overstating the value
of unexpected sensory information (We will consistently
use the term prior to refer to prior perceptual experience).
The size–weight illusion paradigm has been extensively
studied to gain insight into the mechanism of cue integra-
tion for the perception of heaviness. However, to our
knowledge, no study has investigated how the brain esti-
mates object size based on expectations about weight.
Thus, the aim of the present study was to investigate
whether size perception is based on similar processes of
prior and likelihood integration as the perception of
heaviness. An experiment was designed in which partici-
pants lifted boxes of equal size but different weights,
testing whether this would induce a weight–size illusion
(WSI). We then sought to determine the differential effect
of such an illusion on sensorimotor control using a size
matching task. Finally, to obtain a standard of comparison
that allowed us to assess the frequency and magnitude of a
weight–size illusion, the same participants also lifted
objects in a size–weight illusion context.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-one adults (11 #, 10 $; mean age 22.7 ± 3.3
years), naı¨ve to the purpose of the study and with no history
of neurological impairments, participated in this study. 18
out of 21 subjects were right-handed, according to the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield 1971). All
subjects gave voluntary informed consent prior to partici-
pating. The study was approved by the Institutional Review
Board of the University of Minnesota.
Stimuli and procedure: size–weight illusion experiment
Stimuli
Fifteen rigid plastic boxes of equal height (6 cm) and width
(4 cm) but varying length (3–10 cm in 0.5 cm increments)
were used (for the purpose of this paper, we use the term
‘‘size’’ to refer to the length of the box). The size 6.5 cm
box served as the standard stimulus. The remaining 14
boxes served as comparison stimuli. The weight of all
comparison stimuli and the standard stimulus was 350 g.
Five additional boxes weighing 200, 250, 300, 400, or
450 g all with a fixed length of 6.5 cm were used as
distracters.
Procedure
Participants were seated on an adjustable chair in front of a
table. The upper arm on the non-dominant side was held in
a neutral position with the elbow flexed at 90 and the hand
placed on the edge of the table. The non-dominant hand
was used to execute all lifts. The standard or the com-
parison box was then placed in front of the participant’s
resting hand by the experimenter. After an auditory signal
(‘‘Lift’’), the participant grasped the box along its length
axis, which varied between boxes, using a precision grip
(tips of the thumb and the index finger). The arm move-
ment consisted of elbow flexion and extension in the sag-
ittal plane. Participants were instructed to lift vertically and
not to tilt the object. This eliminated any object size-
dependent differences in torque or inertial moments, which
may influence weight perception (Flanagan and Beltzner
2000). Participants were instructed to perform the lift to a
height of about 10 cm above the table, then to hold the box
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in this position for 2 s (hold phase) while rendering a
verbal judgment about its perceived heaviness. Vision was
occluded throughout the experiment. In advance of the
experiment, participants performed practice lifts to expe-
rience grasping without vision.
Judgments were based on the magnitude estimation
procedure (Stevens 1953; Zwislocki and Goodman 1980),
where participants voice a number that best represents the
perceived weight of the box. No constraints were placed on
the value of the first number, stating the magnitude of the
first perceived weight. However, the numbers stated in
subsequent trials had to be proportional to the increase or
decrease in perceived object weight (e.g., if the initial
weight was judged as ‘‘5,’’ a weight perceived as twice as
heavy needed to be judged as ‘‘10’’). All participants
underwent a short training exercise and practice session
before the start of the trials to ensure that they understood
the procedure. After the rating, the box was placed back on
the table and the hand returned to the starting point. As
soon as the box was replaced, the experimenter exchanged
the previous test box with a new box. The time interval
between stimuli presentation was held constant. For each
trial, the number value assigned by the participant to the
comparison box could have been smaller (i.e., perceived as
lighter), larger (i.e., heavier), or the same as the number
assigned to the standard box.
Each trial consisted of two lifts, one using the 6.5 cm
standard box and one using a comparison box. The order of
lifts was pseudorandom and assured that subjects never
lifted the same object more than twice in a row. Each of
the 14 comparison boxes was compared four times to the
standard object. The mean of the numbers assigned for the
four trials represents the perceived magnitude estimation
(PME) for a given comparison box. In addition, five ran-
domly placed distracter trials, with boxes of different
weights, were included in the testing sequence but were not
used in further analysis. Thus, each subject executed 61
trials resulting in a total of 122 lifts. Participants were
given two breaks to maintain their concentration level.
Stimuli and procedure: weight–size illusion experiment
Stimuli
While the SWI experiment used boxes of varying length,
but constant weight, this experiment used a set of eleven
boxes of different weights, but of constant length. Their
weight ranged from 100 to 600 g in 50 g increments with
the 350 g box serving as standard stimulus. The
remaining ten boxes served as comparison stimuli.
The length of each box was fixed at 6.5 cm, which was
the size of the standard box used in the SWI experiment.
Five additional boxes were used as distracters, varying in
length (5, 5.5, 6, 7, and 7.5 cm) but with an identical
weight of 350 g. All of the boxes had the same height and
width (6 9 4 cm).
Procedure
Participants performed the same lifting movements as in
the SWI experiment with their non-dominant hand, but
were asked to make magnitude estimations about the per-
ceived size instead of the weight of the box. In addition to
giving a verbal judgment, participants were asked to match
the perceived size of the box with the index finger and the
thumb of their dominant hand as if they would grasp the
same box. This hand aperture (HA) gesture was executed
while the non-dominant hand held the object, assuring that
differences in memory processing could not account for
possible differences in size perception.
Hand apertures were recorded using an optoelectronic
motion capture system (Peak Motus) with a 120-Hz sam-
pling frequency. Each recording lasted 5 s. Infrared
reflective markers were attached to the tips of index finger
and thumb. Before each data collection, a baseline
recording was collected in which the participants were
asked to hold the standard box along its length dimension
(6.5 cm) using the thumb and index finger of their domi-
nant hand. This procedure was performed to determine the
distance between finger and thumb markers during holding,
which allowed us to account for individual differences in
finger size.
Each trial consisted of two lifts (standard and compar-
ison box) for a total of 40 trials (four trials for each com-
parison box). Order of the presentation (comparison or
standard) was pseudorandom. Five additional distracter
trials, with boxes of varying length, were randomly inser-
ted into the trial sequence, which were not investigated
afterward. Vision was occluded at all times and two breaks
were provided to assure continued attention. All partici-
pants completed the SWI and the WSI experiment at a
maximum of 10 days apart (range: 1–10 days; mean:
4.6 ± 2.3 days). The testing order was counterbalanced
across all subjects.
Measurements
Measuring the frequency of the size–weight illusion
To obtain a measure of how susceptible an individual was
to perceive an illusion, we followed the procedure descri-
bed by Kawai et al. (2007) and first computed the per-
centage of possible responses (e.g., heavier, similar, and
lighter) for each size (e.g., 50 % heavier, 25 % lighter, and
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25 % same for the 5.5 cm box). These individual per-
centages were then averaged across subjects (i.e., mean of
% heavier, mean of % lighter, and mean of % same) for
each comparison box (see Fig. 1). To obtain a measure of
the frequency of the illusion for each subject, their
respective percentage responses ‘‘heavier’’ and ‘‘lighter’’
were computed and subsequently averaged (see Fig. 2). In
other words, an individual’s frequency of the occurrence of
an illusion reflected how often the participant did not
respond ‘‘same,’’ which would have been the correct
answer. For simplicity and in accordance with Kawai et al.
(2007), we use the term frequency of the illusion rather
than the ‘‘frequency of the occurrence of the illusion’’ in
this paper.
Measuring the frequency of the weight–size illusion
To obtain the frequency of the occurrence of the WSI as a
function of object weight, we employed the same proce-
dure as described above. However, here the subjects’
responses were categorized as either shorter (number
assigned to the comparison box was smaller than the
standard box) or longer (number assigned to the compar-
ison box was larger than the standard box).
Magnitude difference
To correct for scaling shifts during the experiment, a per-
ceived magnitude difference (PMD) between the
Fig. 1 Frequency of the size–weight illusion (SWI) and weight–size
illusion (WSI) for each comparison box. Each bar represents the
mean percentage of all participants’ responses for each comparison
box based upon their verbal magnitude estimation of either weight or
size. SWI The shorter comparison boxes ranged from 3 to 6 cm and
the larger ranged from 7 to 10 cm. The 6.5 cm box served as the
standard. The weight for all boxes was 350 g. WSI The lighter
comparison boxes ranged from 100 to 300 g and the heavier from 400
to 600 g. The size for all boxes was fixed at 6.5 cm. The 350 g box
served as the standard
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comparison and the standard box in each trial was com-
puted as follows:
PMD ¼ PME comparison box  PME standard boxð Þ=½
PME standard box  100%;
This conversion not only allows for comparison between
first and last trials within each participant’s data but also
across participants. This ratio was further used to describe
the strength of the illusions.
Hand aperture measures
The hand aperture data analysis was performed using
customized software routines in MATLAB 7.0 Technical
Programming Language. The raw time-position data of the
markers were filtered offline using a fourth-order low-pass
Butterworth filter with a cutoff frequency of 4 Hz. From
the 5 s recorded, the last second of the filtered time-posi-
tion data (120 data points) was used to calculate the mean
distance between the two markers, because the last second
of holding the hand gesture most accurately reflected the
final size judgment. If the last second was unusable due to
dropping the scaling hand during the hold phase, a manu-
ally defined window of 120 data points was chosen to
derive an aperture measure. The hand aperture displayed
for each box was then calculated as follows, taking the
calibration aperture (baseline recording) into account:
HA ¼ HA Box  ðCalibration Distance  6:5cmÞ;
with 6.5 cm indicating the size of the standard box,
HA_Box = hand aperture for the tested box and
Calibration Distance = size of the standard box ? the
dimension of the marked finger tips. The hand aperture data
for each comparison stimuli and for the standard box were
averaged for each participant across all trials. In addition to
the HA, a hand aperture difference (HAD) was calculated for
each comparison box using the following formula:
HAD ¼mean HA comparison box  mean HA standard boxÞ=
mean HA standard box  100%
Normalization of data
Data from the two experiments could not be compared
directly due to different units of the steps between the
comparison boxes for the two experiments (cm vs. g). In
order to make the two experiments comparable, each
comparison box was labeled with a digit. The digit repre-
sented the number of steps the comparison box was apart
from the standard box. Negative digits were assigned for
comparison boxes, which were either smaller (SWI) or
lighter (WSI). Comparison boxes, which were larger (SWI)
or heavier (WSI) than the standard box, were given a
positive digit. For the SWI, the positive labels for the larger
boxes were: 1 = 7.0, 2 = 7.5, 3 = 8, 4 = 8.5, 5 = 9,
6 = 9.5, and 7 = 10 cm. The smaller boxes were labeled
as follows: -1 = 6, -2 = 5.5, -3 = 5, -4 = 4.5,
-5 = 4, -6 = 3.5, and -7 = 3 cm. The same digits were
used for the Experiment 2 (WSI). Heavier comparison
boxes were therefore labeled as 1 = 400, 2 = 450,
3 = 500, 4 = 550, 5 = 600 g and -1, -2, -3, -4, and
-5 were the labels for the 300, 250, 200, 150, and 100 g,
respectively. Thus, a change from 0.5 cm in the WSI was
weighted as a 1 and was thus considered equal to a 50 g
change in the SWI.
Data reduction and correction
The first three complete records of hand apertures for each
comparison box and the first 30 records for the standard
box were used for further analysis (first valid 75 % of the
recordings). If the minimum of three apertures for each
comparison box was not obtained during the last second of
recording, they were manually adjusted. Out of 1,140 valid
apertures, 14 recordings were manually adjusted (1.2 % of
the data). Due to technical problems with the motion
capture system, hand aperture data of two participants were
corrupted and could not be analyzed.
Fig. 2 Frequency of the size–weight illusion (SWI) and weight–size
illusion (WSI) by participant. Each data point represents the observed
frequency of the WSI and SWI for each participant. The dashed line
indicates the line of equality, where both illusions occurred at equal
frequency. Data points above the line of equality indicate that the
participant was more susceptible to the SWI, while data points below
the line of equality reflect a higher susceptibility to the WSI
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Results
Evidence for a size–weight and a weight–size illusion
Participants showed a clear susceptibility for a haptically
induced SWI. Despite the fact that all comparison boxes
had the same weight, boxes which were smaller than the
standard box were more frequently perceived as heavier,
and conversely, comparison boxes larger than the standard
box were perceived as lighter (Fig. 1). The frequency of
the illusion decreased as the size difference between the
comparison and the standard box became smaller. Illusion
frequency for each individual participant ranged from 26.8
to 83.9 % (mean 62.2 ± 3.34 % S.E.).
Participants were also susceptible to a WSI. Figure 1
shows the mean percentage of all participants shorter, or
longer responses for each comparison box. Despite the fact
that all comparison boxes had equal size (6.5 cm), partic-
ipants perceived the size of individual boxes differently.
Comparison boxes, which were lighter than the standard
box, were more frequently perceived as shorter by the
participants than the heavier comparison boxes. Heavier
comparison boxes, in contrast, were perceived as longer.
Illusion frequency decreased as the weight difference
between the comparison and the standard box became
smaller. WSI illusion frequency varied between partici-
pants ranging from 10.0 to 97.5 % (mean 49.4 ± 4.46 %
S.E.).
The data shown in Fig. 2 indicate that participants were
differentially sensitive to either the SWI or the WSI. For
further analysis, participants, who perceived the SWI more
often than the WSI were assigned to a SWI-Group
(N = 15), while participants with a higher frequency for
WSI were categorized as the WSI-Group (N = 6). Sub-
sequent regression procedures determined the respective
slopes and intercepts (SWI group: FreqSWI = 39.5 ? 0.63
FreqWSI (pslope \ 0.001); WSI group: FreqSWI = 39.7 ?
0.22 FreqWSI (pslope = 0.36).
Evidence for an illusion effect on hand aperture scaling
Participants scaled their hand opening according to
expected size based on perceived weight and not according
to the physical size of the box (which was a constant
6.5 cm) (see Fig. 3). The respective mean hand apertures
associated with holding the 100 g versus the 600 g com-
parison box were significantly different for both groups
(SWI-Group: p \ 0.0001; WSI-Group: p \ 0.0001) indi-
cating that hand aperture-to-weight scaling was observed
irrespective of differences in cue sensitivity. The data in
Fig. 3 also indicate that both the WSI and SWI groups
scaled their hand apertures consistently smaller than the
physical size of the box across the tested range of weights,
that is, participants tended to underestimate the true object
size. Moreover, the amount of bias, that is the extent of
underestimating size, was significantly larger in the SWI
group when compared to the WSI group (WSI mean:
5.6 cm ± 0.13 S.E.; SWI mean: 4.9 cm ± 0.07 S.E.;
p \ 0.0001). Relating the observed aperture bias to phys-
ical object size showed that the hand aperture of the WSI
group was 13.3 % (0.9 cm) smaller than the physical size,
while the SWI-Group exhibited a bias of 25.5 % (1.6 cm).
To investigate whether participants adapted their hand
aperture during repeated testing, the first and last hand
aperture values for the 100 and 600 g comparison boxes
were compared for each participant. No significant differ-
ence was found for either weight (100 g: SWI-Group:
p = 0.415, WSI-Group: p = 0.186; 600 g: SWI-Group
p = 0.150, WSI-Group p = 0.83).
Comparison between perception and hand aperture
scaling
Using perceived magnitude difference (PMD) and hand
aperture difference (HAD) as relative measures allowed for
a comparison of weight–size illusion effect on the per-
ceptual versus the motor system. Both variables were
highly correlated with each other (r = 0.88). This strong
association between perceptual judgments and sensorimo-
tor judgments was also observed when considering their
respective raw measures (PME and HA, r = 0.77) that
indicate size in absolute units (cm), that is, the association
is not explained by the transformation from absolute to
Fig. 3 Hand aperture as a function of physical weight of a box. The
dashed line indicates the actual size of each box (6.5 cm). Data points
represent the mean aperture across each group (SWI or WSI group).
Note that aperture values were below the physical size in both groups
with the magnitude of the underestimation being consistently smaller
in the WSI-Group
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relative values. The PME mean values for each of the 10
comparison weights ranged from 4.99 to 6.04, while the
corresponding mean hand apertures ranged from 4.79 to
5.26 (cm) indicating that, on average, both perceptual as
well as sensorimotor judgments underestimated physical
object size (6.5 cm).
For the SWI-Group, the strongest illusion for the lighter
comparison boxes was perceived for the 100 g box (6.2 cm
or 4.7 % shorter). The 400 g box was perceived as the
longest comparison box compared to the standard box
(5.5 % longer). For the WSI-Group, the strongest illusions
were perceived for the lightest and heaviest comparison
boxes (100 and 600 g). Converting the relative percentage
scores to perceived size, the 100 g box was rated as 5.0 cm
(21.9 % shorter) and the 600 g box as 8.3 cm (27.5 %
longer) than the standard, that is, there was a mean range of
3.3 cm between the smallest and largest perceived size for
a box; both boxes had the same physical size (6.5 cm).
The relative difference data (PMD, HAD) of the weight–
size illusion experiment revealed that both the perceptual
and motor systems were influenced by the illusion (see
Fig. 4). Respective linear regression procedures were
computed to discern differences in slopes. For the SWI-
Group, the slopes (s) were not significantly different from
each other (PMD: s = 0.014, HAD: s = 0.015; p = 0.83;
see Fig. 4 top), indicating that both systems were compa-
rably biased by the different weights of the comparison
boxes. In the WSI-Group, the respective regression coeffi-
cients for the slopes were different from each other (PMD:
s = 0.093, HAD: s = 0.023; p \ 0.0001; see Fig. 4 bot-
tom). However, when performing the equivalent analysis on
the raw aperture data, this later difference is no longer
present. Thus, caution is warranted in concluding a differ-
ence in gain between the two systems in the WSI group.
Discussion
This study was designed to achieve two aims: First, to
obtain a better understanding of the underlying mecha-
nisms of object perception by investigating how afferent
feedback about size and weight and prior experience are
combined by the perceptual system to achieve a stable
percept. Second, to examine whether size and weight cues
are differentially evaluated by the perceptual and sensori-
motor system. Studying the saliency of size and weight as
cues for perception and action in the context of illusions
allowed for the systematic manipulation of either size or
weight to examine the effect on perceptual as well as motor
performance. The main results of the study were as fol-
lows: First, the study demonstrated the existence of a
haptically induced weight–size illusion. This finding
implies that size is not a dominant cue for both weight and
size perception. Instead, size and weight cues are both
taken into account for both forms of perception. Second,
not only weight but also size perception is based on an
integration of both former experience and sensory input.
Third, individuals had a tendency to be more sensitive to
either weight or size cues, revealing individual differences
in the way those cues were weighted during cue integra-
tion. Finally, perceived weight and not afferent haptic size
information determined the aperture of the non-exploring
hand, indicating that the motor system was influenced by
the WSI.
The size–weight and the weight–size illusion
Ellis and Lederman (1993) concluded that the size–weight
illusion is primarily a haptic phenomenon and that haptic
cues alone had the same influence as the combination of
haptic and visual cues on weight perception. Nevertheless,
Fig. 4 Comparing perceptual and motor measures of object size as a
function of object weight. Shown are the means for each subgroup
(SWI vs. WSI-Group) when judging size as a function of weight. The
abscissa shows the weight of the comparison boxes (stan-
dard = 350 g), the ordinate represents the relative difference between
the constant physical size (6.5 cm for all boxes) and the verbal and
motor-based size judgments (perceived magnitude difference vs. hand
aperture difference). Note that ordinate scales differ between graphs
as the WSI group exhibited larger differences in perceived magnitude
than the SWI group
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they also showed that SWI can be elicited by vision alone,
although its effect is smaller. The current study replicated
these earlier findings that haptic size cues alone can induce
a size–weight illusion. As shown in Fig. 1, the frequency of
the illusion increased as the difference between the com-
parison and standard box became larger in either direction,
indicating a linear effect of haptic size cues on the per-
ception of heaviness.
The primary focus of this study was to obtain a better
understanding about size and weight cue integration and to
examine whether and under what circumstances humans
perceive a weight–size illusion. The influence from weight
on volume perception had been studied before by Usnadze
(1931). He reported that a tactile WSI can be elicited when
objects of the same size, but different weights are placed on
palmar surface of each hand with participants perceiving
heavier objects as being smaller and lighter as being larger.
We extended this tactile discrimination task to systemati-
cally investigate the influence of former experience about
weight on the sensorimotor system. The results of the
present study indicate the influence of previous experience
about object weight on size perception, as participants
perceived the lighter comparison boxes as shorter and the
heavier as longer than the standard box (see Fig. 1). While
this result seems to stand in contrast to the findings by
Usnadze (1931), the differences in experimental procedure
likely account for the different results. In the Usnadze
experiment, object volume and not length was manipu-
lated, and volume was assessed solely by placing the object
on the surface of the palm, while participants actively
grasped and lifted the object in our study. That is, in our
paradigm, participants received tactile and proprioceptive
signals as well as having access to predicted sensory
feedback from the goal-directed action.
The WSI occurs through a combination of the experi-
ence-based expected size of the box (prior), and afferent
sensory input about the object’s size (likelihood). When the
weight difference between the standard and comparison
box increased, the WSI was more frequently perceived.
This result is analogous to the SWI where the increasing
difference between the sizes of the two boxes influenced
weight perception.
Yet, our data also indicate that the integration of the
prior and likelihood for weight and size perception may be
based on different integration mechanisms. In the size–
weight illusion, participants perceived the smaller com-
parison box to be heavier than the standard box, but based
on former experience, the smaller box should weigh less.
This means that for weight perception, participants com-
bined prior and afferent feedback in a manner contradic-
tory to their experience (see Fig. 5). Brayanov and Smith
(2010) referred to this as an anti-Bayesian form of
integration.
Based on the experience, we would also expect a lighter
box to be smaller and a heavier box to be larger. In the
weight–size illusion, participants indeed perceived the
lighter comparison boxes to be smaller and the heavier
comparison boxes to be larger (see Fig. 1). This is con-
sistent with the view that for size perception, participants
combined prior and likelihood information in a Bayesian
way of integration (see Fig. 5). The results from both
illusion experiments therefore suggest that the nervous
system uses different cue integration mechanisms for
weight and size perception.
Evidence for different sensitivities to size–weight cues
Participants had a tendency to be more susceptible to either
the SWI or the WSI. Given that participants were exposed
to unimodal haptic size and weight cues in both experi-
ments, the individual differences in the susceptibility to a
particular illusion reflect differences in weight cue pro-
cessing. Recent work demonstrated that humans exhibit
different sensitivities to weight cues and that their indi-
vidual weight cue sensitivity positively correlates with
their susceptibility to the SWI (Kawai et al. 2007). Par-
ticipants less sensitive to weight needed a larger difference
between two weights to perceive them as dissimilar. The
authors suggested that the illusion frequency for the size–
weight experiment is based on the difference between the
standard and the comparison box and, at least partially, on
differences in the sensitivity to weight cues. With respect
to our findings, this interpretation implies that the differ-
ence in the frequency of the two illusions is due to indi-
vidual differences in the sensitivity to either haptic size or
weight cues. This differential cue susceptibility also had an
effect on motor function, because those who were more
susceptible to the WSI also had significantly larger hand
openings to indicate perceived size that those more sensi-
tive to weight cues (see Fig. 3).
Using size cues for perception or sensorimotor action
The assumption of two separate systems evaluating sensory
information for perception and action is not new. The idea
of two separate streams for processing visual information,
the ventral and dorsal stream, was first described by
Mishkin and Ungerleider (1982). In the framework of the
Ebbinghaus illusion, Aglioti et al. (1995) reported that
participants used the same hand aperture to grasp objects,
which they had perceived as being different in size. Such
dissociation between the motor and the perceptual system
has also been observed within the context of the size–
weight illusion (Flanagan and Beltzner 2000; Grandy and
Westwood 2006). These studies showed that grip force
rapidly adapts to the physical weight of the box even
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though the participants still perceived the smaller object as
heavier and the larger as lighter. Nevertheless, Flanagan
et al. (2008) were able show that weight perception also
adapts, but more slowly. Instead of five to ten trials, the
perceptual system needs thousands of lifts. These findings
may indicate that the perception prior differs from the
action prior as it appears to be more resistant to change.
The results of Brayanov and Smith (2010) indicate that
although the prior and likelihood were integrated in an
anti-Bayesian way for weight perception, the motor system
seems to use a Bayesian integration method. These findings
suggest a separation between the perceptual and sensori-
motor system (i.e., grip force control was not guided by the
lifter’s perception of object weight—see Fig. 5). However,
with respect to our data obtained in the WSI experiment,
the strong correlation between sensorimotor and perceptual
judgments of object size (hand aperture and verbal judg-
ment) could also be interpreted as an indication that per-
ceptual and sensorimotor systems at least share some
information about object weight and size, that is, they may
share neural resources and are not rigidly separated.
This study focused on the influence of the WSI on the
motor system and how haptic size and weight cues are
integrated. Our results show that the performance of the
motor task was clearly influenced by varying the weights of
the lifted boxes, as hand aperture increased as a function of
increasing object weight (see Figs. 3, 4). The motor effect
of the illusion persisted from the first lift to the last lift of a
particular box as the scaling of the hand aperture did not
change significantly over trials. Given that no feedback
about performance was provided, the lack of an explicit
error signal impeded learning.
However, this lack of adaptation during the WSI
experiment allowed us to inspect how size cues are eval-
uated for sensorimotor action. If the sensorimotor system
depends solely on afferent sensory information to adjust
the opening of the hand to the size of an object, no vari-
ation in hand aperture for the different comparison boxes
would have been observed, that is, hand aperture size
would have been the same for all eleven boxes as all had
the same physical size. This is not what we observed. In
contrast, if the sensorimotor system only considers former
experience (the prior) that size and weight increase linearly
for boxes of the same density, then hand aperture should
match the expected size for each weight. For example, if an
object weighs a fourth of another object, the size of the
lighter object should also be four times smaller than the
size of the heavier object and the hand aperture should also
be a fourth of the size of heavier box (i.e., 75 % smaller).
Yet, the smallest observed hand apertures were only 5 %
(SWI-Group) or 22 % (WSI-Group) smaller than the
standard box (see Fig. 4). These findings refute the
assumption that the sensorimotor system relies solely on
the prior to evaluate weight of a graspable object. Instead,
Fig. 5 Processing model of weight and size cues integration for
action and perception. The object has two physical properties: weight
and size. Solid arrows indicate processing flow for weight perception,
while dashed arrows refer to size perception. For the perceptual and
the motor system, the object’s size and weight cues are inputs to a
Forward Dynamic Model (FDM) representing the stored object
experience. The FDM output is the experience-based expected weight
or size, which can be described as a Gaussian distribution, and is
referred to as the prior. The prior is then integrated with the
likelihood, which represents the afferent sensory information about
object weight and size. Two separate processing streams with two
different integration mechanisms (Anti-Bayesian vs. Bayesian) are
assumed for weight and size perception, respectively. A feedback
loop with a specified gain provides the FDM with the final estimate of
weight or size, which serves as a learning signal (arrows crossing the
FDM boxes) for adapting object experience (e.g., when weight or size
changes). Experimental findings in the context of the size–weight
illusion and the weight–size illusion suggest separate cue integration
processes for the perceptual and motor system
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it is consistent with a view that cue integration by the
sensorimotor system combines both prior and likelihood in
a Bayesian manner. Furthermore, our data show that the
weighting of the prior and likelihood are dependent on the
individual’s sensitivity to either the weight or the size cues.
Finally, we need to consider that participants scaled
their hand aperture consistently smaller than the physical
size of the box across the tested range of weights (see
Fig. 3), that is, while one hand explored the object, the
other ‘‘matching’’ hand tended to underestimate true object
size. Moreover, the amount of bias, that is the extent of
underestimating size, was significantly larger in the SWI
group when compared to the WSI group. The latter finding
is explained by the individual differences in weight–size
cue integration. However, the consistent underestimation
cannot be explained as a sensory integration phenomenon.
It is likely due to a bias introduced in subsequent senso-
rimotor transformations, that is, the processes necessary to
transform perceived size to the motor commands of the
opposite hand.
A model for integrating size and weight cues for action
and perception
What does the finding of a weight–size illusion and its
influence on the motor system mean for our understanding
of cue integration for perception and sensorimotor action?
Based on our results and previous work, it now becomes
possible to arrive at a processing model that summarizes
the differences in integration of sensory and prior infor-
mation for perception and action (Fig. 5).
Consider first that during the lifting of a box, afferent
haptic information about the object’s weight and size
becomes available centrally. Further assume that former
object experience is stored in a Forward Dynamic Model
(FDM) that captures the physical properties of the object.
The input of the FDM is sensory cue information about
size and weight, its output is the expected size or weight
of the object. Thus, FDMs link size cues with expected
weight and weight cues with expected size. The expected
object features (weight/size) can then be described as a
Gaussian distribution (given the system is not noise free)
and can be referred to as the prior, representing the
expectation based on former experience. One explanation
for the occurrence of the SWI is a mismatch between the
predicted sensory feedback generated by a forward
dynamic model and the actual sensory feedback from the
periphery (Ross 1969), although this sensorimotor mis-
match hypothesis has been criticized (Ernst 2009),
because it has been shown that the sensorimotor system
adapts and corrects for this initial mismatch (Flanagan
and Beltzner 2000).
The results from this study indicate that weight and size
perception are based on the different combinations of prior
and likelihood. For weight perception, the prior and the
likelihood are integrated in an anti-Bayesian manner,
overstating the value of unexpected sensory information. In
contrast, for size perception, prior and likelihood are
integrated in a Bayesian way. A feedback loop with a
specified gain provides the FDM with a copy from the
estimated weight enabling it to adapt to the actual physical
weight/size of the lifted box. Based on the assumption that
weight as well as size perception are based on the same
FDM, the gain of the feedback loop has to be the same for
the size as well as for weight perception.
The finding that the frequency of a particular illusion is
related to an individual’s varying sensitivity to weight or
size is also explained by the model. For individuals who
are more sensitive to size, the expected size (prior for size)
has a higher perceptual weighting than the expected weight
(prior for weight). The inverse would be true for an indi-
vidual more sensitive to weight. Weighting one prior
higher is only possible, if there is a separation at the level
of integration (see Fig. 5).
Based on the findings of our and previous SWI experi-
ments (Flanagan and Beltzner 2000; Grandy and West-
wood 2006), a separation between processing object cues
for perception and action is plausible. Here, the two sys-
tems only share the afferent sensory input (size and
weight), but operate otherwise independently from each
other. However, we need to be cognizant to the fact that
this experiment cannot fully dissociate, if differences in
scaling are the result of two separate neural processes (cue
integration for perceptual or sensorimotor tasks) or are the
result of one process with two distinct response continua.
Nevertheless, the model can explain the existence of both
size–weight illusions and provides a framework for the
development of a more complete computational model.
Conclusion
The results of this study indicate that not only weight but
also size perception are biased by former experience. In
addition, the integration of prior and likelihood seems to be
different for haptic size and weight perception (Bayesian
vs. anti-Bayesian). Further, humans may be more suscep-
tible to one specific haptic cue, either weight or size.
Finally, the results of this study clearly indicate that both,
the perceptual and the sensorimotor system, are biased by
the WSI. However, in comparison with the SWI, it is not
clear whether both systems work independently or if hand
aperture was guided by the same processes that underlie
size perception.
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